>It was published by the NSA with two "random" looking points P1 and P2. There is no indication of how these values were generated.

>The values for the points P1 and P2 could have been chosen randomly or they could have been chosen with a deliberate relationship. If they were chosen deliberately, there is a backdoor. If they truly were chosen randomly, then finding the internal state is as difficult as breaking elliptic curve cryptography. Unfortunately, there is no way to identify if the two points were chosen together or randomly without either solving the elliptic curve discrete logarithm function, or catching the algorithm's author with the secret backdoor value. This is the nature of a one-way trapdoor function.

>The authors did not provide any proof of randomness for the two points P1 and P2. This could have easily been done by choosing P1 and P2 as outputs of a hash function, but they did not. This is just one of many flaws in the design of this algorithm.

>The evidence is mounting for Dual_EC_DRBG being well-suited for use as a back door. A working proof of concept backdoor was published in late 2013 using OpenSSL, and a patent for using the construction as "key escrow" (another term for backdoor) was filed back in 2006.

>Up until recently, Dual_EC_DRBG was the default random number generator for several cryptographic products from RSA (the security division of EMC), even though cryptographers have long been skeptical of the algorithm's design. There are reports of impropriety connecting a $10 million investment by the United States government and RSA's decision to use this obscure and widely maligned algorithm in their widely-distributed products.

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>pic relatedkeynesian jews deserve the ropemonero is sound money, safe modekeep stacking crypto/metals broscash is trashfuck…

>pic related
keynesian jews deserve the rope
monero is sound money, safe mode
keep stacking crypto/metals bros
cash is trash
fuck…